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Abstract
The contemporary literature on the philosophy of human rights features a clash between two 
opposing theoretical paradigms. The first paradigm, called Functionalism, grounds the nature of 
human rights in their practical or political significance. The second paradigm, called Foundation-
alism, grounds the nature of human rights in a pre-political substratum of moral thought to which 
positive legal-political institutions ought to conform. What tends to make the first paradigm more 
appealing is that it avoids the problem of grounding human rights in moral considerations that 
may be ethnocentric and thus not acceptable to all peoples everywhere. This paper makes a case 
for a version of Foundationalism called Natural Law Foundationalism, which has often been over-
looked in the contemporary literature. It argues that Natural Law Foundationalism is a promising 
view because it is capable of confronting the ethnocentricity problem more effectively than other 
versions of Foundationalism. It also argues that the view can deliver on its promise because its 
main tenets have sufficient philosophical defensibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 in 1948, the legal and politi-
cal regime of universal human rights is a familiar and thriving practice within the global 
arena of state action. The high-priority norms it establishes help to protect people every-
where from abuses of state power. It is undoubtedly a complex phenomenon. As put by 
Rainer Forst,2 human rights have a moral dimension; they represent urgent moral con-
* JD Candidate (2015), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada. This article was originally writ-
ten for Professor Brian Slattery’s 2012–13 first-year Legal Theory Seminar on universal human rights at 
Osgoode Hall Law School. I would like to thank Professor Slattery for his amiable tutelage and poignant 
objections to earlier versions of the article. I would also like to thank Jessica Fleming and Ruth Massey for 
editorial assistance. The article was awarded the 2014 Osgoode Hall Law School JSD Torys Research and 
Writing Award.
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
2 See Rainer Forst, ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive 
Approach’ (2010) 120 Ethics 711, 711–12. 
(2014) 5(2) TLT 218–240DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/20414005.5.2.218
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cerns that states must never ignore. They have a political dimension; they set standards of 
basic political legitimacy. They have a legal dimension; they are posited and enshrined in 
national constitutions and international treaties. They have a social dimension; they are 
asserted for the purposes of resisting oppression and exploitation. The study of universal 
human rights accordingly engages a variety of disciplines, incorporating perspectives 
from law, politics, sociology and anthropology. 
This paper offers a contribution to the philosophical study of human rights. Ascer-
taining the domain of the philosophy of human rights is, unsurprisingly, a contested 
matter in itself. I shall take as a starting point the guiding proposition that the philoso-
phy of human rights investigates the nature of a human right, or what kind of object a 
human right is within our broader system of normative thinking. This aim is distinct 
from that of, for example, charting the history of human rights theory or practice or 
exploring the social, legal or political motivations or ramifications of enacting positive 
instruments that codify human rights. These distinct aims may, of course, overlap with 
the project of investigating the nature of human rights. Our guiding proposition about 
the philosophy of human rights, however, is that it is concerned with the most general 
and abstract grounds of our thinking about the objects that we term ‘human rights’, as 
well as the criteria for the correct use of that term.3 It supports the distinct aims by shed-
ding light on that object whose history, motivations and ramifications the distinct aims 
explore.
The contemporary philosophy of human rights literature features a clash between 
two opposing theoretical paradigms. Following John Tasioulas, I will call these para-
digms Foundationalism and Functionalism.4 According to Foundationalism, the nature 
of a human right is specifiable by normative considerations that refer, not to the 
characteristics of any positive institutions purporting to codify human rights, but to 
characteristics that a person has simply in virtue of her humanity, that is, her human 
nature, or her status or dignity qua human being. On this view, a human right is not 
something that a person possesses as a result of her membership in any legal, political 
or social association. Instead, the grounds of human rights are found in a more founda-
tional pre-political substratum of moral thought in terms of which positive institutions 
may be criticised. By contrast, Functionalism, whose initial advocate was John Rawls,5 
3 For further discussion of a similar conception of the philosophy of human rights, see James Griffin, On 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008) 14–18. See also Charles R Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 11. 
4 John Tasioulas, ‘Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 1, 6. Elsewhere, 
Tasioulas has called Foundationalism the ‘orthodox conception of human rights’.: John Tasioulas, ‘Are 
Human Rights Essentially Triggers for Intervention?’ (2009) 4 Philosophy Compass 938, 938. Foundation-
alism has also been called Naturalism or Traditionalism: see Beitz (n 3) 49; Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights 
Without Foundations’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 321, 323. Functionalism has also been called the ‘practical conception’ of 
human rights, or the ‘political conception’: see Beitz (n 3) 102; Tasioulas, ‘Triggers’, ibid; Raz, ibid, 327.
5 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999) 78–82.
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takes the existing practice of the human rights regime as its point of departure. On this 
view, the nature of a human right is grounded in its functional role in regulating the con-
duct of political institutions within the legal-political practice of universal human rights, 
not in a more foundational, pre-political substratum of moral thought. A human right 
is an international norm or standard that gives certain reasons to actors in the global 
forum to behave in specified ways.
My goal in this essay is to make a case for a version of Foundationalism that I will 
call Natural Law Foundationalism. As the moniker suggests, this approach takes inspira-
tion from the natural law tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, as it has been developed 
more recently by the legal philosopher John Finnis.6 It interprets the Foundationalist 
claim that human rights are essentially linked to the notion of humanity by holding that 
the normative considerations which specify the grounds of human rights are universal 
human goods discoverable by the natural use of human practical reason. These goods 
constitute the foundational, pre-political substratum to which the positive legal-political 
universal human rights regime is answerable. Moreover, the view claims that natural 
human practical reason has self-evident epistemological access to the goods in question, 
which are universally knowable by all peoples. 
Natural Law Foundationalism has been mentioned in passing amidst the contem-
porary clash between Foundationalism and Functionalism, but it is underdeveloped 
compared to what I will call Metaphysical Foundationalism. I intend to demonstrate 
that it deserves greater attention. This is because it promises to be able to confront the 
main Functionalist objection to Foundationalism—namely that Foundationalism’s 
adumbration of the nature of a human right is fundamentally ethnocentric—more 
straightforwardly than Metaphysical Foundationalism. Furthermore, I intend to show 
that Natural Law Foundationalism is able to make good on its promise. This is because 
its central claims about human practical reason and the universal self-evidence of basic 
human goods have sufficient philosophical plausibility. In short, the thesis of this essay is 
that Natural Law Foundationalism is a legitimate participant in the contemporary clash 
between Foundationalism and Functionalism, and that the view should be taken more 
seriously as such.
I proceed as follows. In Part II, I explicate in greater detail the Functionalist and 
Foundationalist approaches to human rights, as well as the differences between Meta-
physical Foundationalism and Natural Law Foundationalism. In Part III, I discuss the 
ethnocentricity objection to Foundationalism that gives Functionalism its appeal. I 
argue that Natural Law Foundationalism is a promising view because it is postured in 
a way that allows it to specifically confront that objection. The posture of Metaphysical 
Foundationalism, by contrast, only allows it to confront the objection indirectly. In Part 
IV, I take steps towards showing that Natural Law Foundationalism can deliver on its 
promise. I do so by exploring John Finnis’s contention that the human goods posited by 
6 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2011). 
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the view are self-evidently discoverable from the perspective of natural human practical 
reason. In Part V, I build on his contention to show that Natural Law Foundationalism 
can offer at least a plausible response to the ethnocentricity objection. 
II. FUNCTIONALISM, METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONALISM
AND NATURAL LAW FOUNDATIONALISM
Functionalism
I will begin by discussing Functionalism. Functionalism grounds the nature of a human 
right in its practical significance. A human right represents a norm the protection, recog-
nition or violation of which gives states reasons for behaving in certain ways in the global 
forum of political action. The basis for identifying exactly what these reasons are is taken 
to be the practice of the legal-political human rights regime itself. Joseph Raz explains 
that the primary task of Functionalism is ‘to establish the essential features which con-
temporary human rights practice attributes to the rights it acknowledges to be human 
rights’.7 Similarly, Charles Beitz holds that Functionalism frames our understanding of 
what kind of thing a human right is by identifying the roles that a human right plays 
within the practice of the human rights regime. By registering the practical inferences 
that would be drawn by competent participants in the practice from what they regard 
as valid claims of human rights, Beitz claims, we can generate a view of the functions of 
human rights that informs an account of their nature.8
John Rawls’s influential account of human rights precipitated modern Functional-
ism. In The Law of Peoples he states, ‘Human rights are a class of rights that play a special 
role … they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits 
to [a] regime’s internal autonomy’.9 This conception of the role of human rights reflects 
how the post-World War II human rights regime has altered interactions between sover-
eign states at the global level. The regime has made it the case that states’ sovereignty is 
limited to their conformity to the norms codified in positive human rights texts. War is 
no longer an admissible means of government policy; instead, it is (normally) justified 
only in urgent cases of intervention to protect human rights.10 Building on Rawls’s view, 
Raz holds that human rights
7 Raz (n 4) 237. 
8 Beitz (n 3) 102. 
9 Rawls (n 5) 79. 
10 Ibid. I say that war is normally justified only in these circumstances in order to leave room for the permis-
sibility of states engaging in just war efforts where such efforts are needed for them to defend themselves 
from military threats. The morality of war is a topic I will not examine here. For further discussion of the 
morality of war, see Tom Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’ (2005) 33(1) Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 34; Jeff McMahan, ‘Just Causes for War’ (2005) 19(3) Ethics and International Affairs 1. 
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set limits to the sovereignty of states, in that their actual or anticipated violation is a (defea-
sible) reason for taking action against the violator in the international arena, even when—in 
cases not involving violation of either human rights or the commission of other offences—
the action would not be permissible, or normatively available on the grounds that it would 
infringe the sovereignty of the state.11
Thus, a key assertion of Functionalism since Rawls’s seminal account is that, within the 
practice of the legal-political universal human rights regime, international human rights 
norms define the parameters of a state’s sovereignty. A state forfeits its sovereignty if it 
violates those norms or fails to take positive steps to honour them within its territory.12 
This violation or failure gives other political actors a reason to intervene in that state’s 
territory to secure its citizens’ human rights through diplomatic, economic or military 
measures, and it functions to disable the state from appealing to its sovereignty to resist 
such intervention.13
Functionalism does not deny that a goal of human rights norms is to protect import-
ant human interests against oppression or neglect.14 It just denies that human rights are 
grounded in a foundational, pre-political moral substratum that determines what those 
human interests are.15 This is the approach recommended by Foundationalism, which 
we will consider below. Instead, Functionalism grounds human rights in a construal of 
what it means for participants in the international human rights regime to recognise 
norms that protect important human interests, having particular regard to the norms’ 
role in constraining the conduct of states. 
Metaphysical Foundationalism
I will now focus on Foundationalism. Foundationalism grounds the nature of a human 
right in normative considerations that are conceptually prior to any positive institu-
tions that codify or make use of human rights. It formulates the assertion that a person’s 
human rights are to be legally protected through two serially ordered but complemen-
tary movements of thought. First, it isolates morally significant characteristics that a 
person has simply in virtue of her humanity, independently of any social, political or 
legal association to which she belongs. Second, it regards these characteristics as univer-
11 Raz (n 4) 328. 
12 Rawls (n 5) 80. See also Tasioulas, ‘Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights’ (n 4) 19.
13 The actions for which human rights norms give reasons are, however, not limited to interventions into 
other states’ sovereignty on a Functionalist view. Legal recognition of human rights in international docu-
ments may give states reasons to enact domestic human rights legislation, to initiate social, economic or 
environmental policies to secure its citizens’ human rights, or to hold other states accountable for initiating 
such policies within their own jurisdiction. Beitz also argues that human rights norms give reasons for a 
state to assist another state in satisfying those norms, if the other state lacks the capacity to do so. See Beitz 
(n 3) 109. 
14 For a Functionalist’s endorsement of this precept, see ibid.
15 Raz (n 4) 332. 
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sal human interests, goods or values attracting the special legal protection of a positive 
human rights regime.16 Hence, it posits a deep moral foundation on which legal recogni-
tion of human rights ought to be based. 
James Griffin’s view of human rights provides an instructive exemplar. For Grif-
fin, what is normatively distinctive about humanity—what gives us our special moral 
status—is our capacity to formulate and pursue a conception of the good life. Our lives 
are distinguished from those of non-human animals because we are agents, ‘deliberat-
ing, assessing, choosing, and acting to make what we see as a good life for ourselves’.17 
The universal human interest that attracts the legal protection of positive human rights 
regimes is thus agency or ‘personhood’.18
Tasioulas rejects Griffin’s Foundationalist view in favour of one that countenances a 
plurality of universal human interests that attract special legal protection. For Tasioulas, 
there is more to what makes human life go well than just agency. Insisting on agency, 
he claims, overlooks how some rights-violating actions can compromise several human 
values: 
The human right not to be tortured, one might plausibly think, owes its existence to the way 
in which torture imperils a plurality of human interests. Victims of torture not only suffer 
excruciating pain, their physical and mental health is threatened, as is their capacity to form 
intimate relationships based on trust, all this in addition to the way that torture attacks their 
autonomy or agency.19
Tasioulas holds that other universal human interests, in addition to agency, that provide 
a moral foundation for human rights include health and accomplishment.20
The shared feature of these Foundationalist accounts to which I want to draw 
attention is that they have what might be called a distinctive theoretical posture. They 
approach the issue of which universal human interests attract positive legal protection 
using a distinctive third-personal or metaphysical methodology. The methodology con-
sists in an observer’s conceptual analysis of the idea of humanity, of what makes human 
life go well, or of what makes human nature especially valuable, worthwhile or of special 
normative status. The resulting normative characteristic or characteristics, putatively 
possessed by a person simply in virtue of her humanity, are therefore discernible from a 
16 For discussion and criticism of this second aspect of the Foundationalist strategy, see ibid at 323–4. 
17 Griffin (n 3) 32. 
18 Ibid, 33. Griffin holds that the value of agency divides into three components: autonomy, which denotes 
our interest in not being controlled by something or someone other than ourselves; ‘minimum provision’, 
which denotes our interest in having the information, education, resources or capabilities that make our 
choices real; and liberty, which denotes our interest in freedom from being constrained from pursuing 
what we regard as a worthwhile life. See also ibid, 149–87.
19 Tasioulas, ‘Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights’ (n 4) 13. 
20 Ibid, 14. Tasioulas regards it as an advantage of his view that it avoids potentially excluding from the protec-
tion of human rights human beings who are not agents, such as newborns, comatose individuals, or those 
suffering from advanced dementia.
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third-personal, metaphysical perspective. They then furnish an assertion that they ought 
to be protected by the legal-political universal human rights regime. Having in view this 
conception of the posture of the theories of human rights exemplified by Griffin and 
Tasioulas, I shall call them Metaphysical Foundationalist theories. 
Natural Law Foundationalism
I will now consider Natural Law Foundationalism. This view interprets the idea that 
human rights are specially connected to the notion of humanity by holding that the 
normative considerations which ground human rights are universal human goods 
discoverable by the natural use of human practical reason. The view has not been devel-
oped as extensively as Metaphysical Functionalism. Consequently, Functionalist critics 
of Foundationalism do not regard it as their primary interlocutor. Beitz, for instance, 
calibrates his attacks on Foundationalism by setting aside Natural Law Foundational-
ism, principally because ‘[Metaphysical Foundationalism] has been more influential in 
modern political thought’.21
Natural Law Foundationalism takes inspiration from the natural law tradition. John 
Finnis describes natural law theory as holding that ‘there is a set of basic practical prin-
ciples which indicate the basic forms of human flourishing to be pursued and realised, 
and which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers what to do’.22 On 
natural law theory, the pursuit of universal human goods is a fundamental requirement 
of natural human practical reason. Thus, to discover what the universal goods are, it is 
necessary to determine what the requirements of practical reason are. We can have self-
evident knowledge of the universal goods because the requirements of practical reason 
are self-evidently knowable through the natural use of human practical reason itself.23
In working with these assertions about natural law theory, I do not aim to defend or 
rely on any particular catalogue of universal human goods that serve as commitments 
of practical reason. Different natural law theorists countenance different catalogues. 
Finnis’s catalogue includes life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, prac-
tical reasonableness, and religion.24 The natural law theorist Mark Murphy’s catalogue 
includes life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, excellence in play and work, excellence 
in agency, inner peace, friendship and community, religion, and happiness.25 For my 
purposes, I draw upon the structure of natural law theory to make the following three 
interrelated claims about Natural Law Foundationalism: 
21 Beitz (n 3) 52. It is telling that Beitz cites the work of John Finnis when describing the sort of Foundational-
ist view that he ignores (at 52).
22 Finnis (n 6) 23. 
23 Ibid, 85–86. 
24 Ibid, 86–90.
25 Mark Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 101–35.
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• It is a type of Foundationalism. It grounds the nature of human rights by linking 
it with the notion of humanity and by identifying normative considerations in the 
context of a pre-political substratum of moral thought to which positive institutions 
ought to conform.26 
• The aforementioned link is forged by the view that there are universal human goods 
the pursuit of which is a requirement of natural human practical reason. These goods 
serve as the foundational, pre-political normative considerations that attract the 
special legal protection of the positive human rights regime.
• Knowledge of the universal human goods is self-evident. From the perspective of 
natural human practical reason itself, it is self-evident that the universal human 
goods are fundamental commitments of natural human practical reason. 
I want to draw attention here to the distinctive theoretical posture of Natural Law 
Foundationalism. Notice that its methodology for identifying universal human goods 
is first-personal, practical and epistemological. It holds that universal human goods are 
such as to attract protection because of their special epistemological status. Their impor-
tance derives from the way in which they are discovered; pursuit of the universal goods 
is a requirement of natural human practical reason, and this is knowable self-evidently, 
simply by reflecting on what it is like to be a human practical agent from the first-personal 
point of view of human practical reason itself. The view appeals to the phenomenology 
of agency and discerns the requirements of human practical reason from the perspec-
tive of the participant in human practical reason, ie from her judgments, valuations and 
experiences, and from the way in which normativity is disclosed to her. 
In this respect, the theoretical posture of Natural Law Foundationalism differs from 
that of Metaphysical Foundationalism. For Metaphysical Foundationalism, recall, the 
universal human interests to which the legal-political human rights regime is answer-
able are identified through third-personal conceptual analysis of the idea of humanity. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the universal human interests are what make 
human nature or human life normatively distinctive, as distinguished from the nature 
or lives of non-human animals. They therefore owe their importance to their special 
metaphysical status.
26 It should be noted that the universal human goods on Finnis’s account are not fully articulable in the con-
text of a pre-political substratum of moral thought because they necessitate a form of human community, 
which ultimately forms the basis of Finnis’s views on politics and jurisprudence: Finnis (n 5) 125. See also 
Beitz (n 2) 50–52. An analysis of the connection between the natural law theory of practical rationality and 
the natural law theory of politics and jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this essay, but that is not to say 
that the connection is uninteresting and unimportant. For discussion, see Murphy (n 25) 3. 
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III. THE ETHNOCENTRICITY PROBLEM AND THE  
PROMISE OF NATURAL LAW FOUNDATIONALISM
The Ethnocentricity Problem
Having defined the landscape of the clash between Functionalism and Foundational-
ism, and having located Natural Law Foundationalism within this landscape, I will now 
consider the main objection to Foundationalism that gives Functionalism its appeal. I 
will call it the Ethnocentricity Problem. The Ethnocentricity Problem poses a question to 
the Foundationalist: How can we know for certain that the pre-political normative con-
siderations to which the positive human rights regime ought to conform are universally 
applicable across cultures?
Human rights purport to protect all people from abuses of state power, even when 
those people disagree radically over moral, political, religious, cultural or philosophical 
worldviews.27 A Foundationalist theory of the nature of human rights therefore fails if 
the moral foundations for human rights that it countenances are not applicable to all 
people and across a wide variety of cultures. That is, it is defective to the extent that those 
foundations are ethnocentric. The foundations are ethnocentric if they are applicable 
within only a particular moral, political, religious or philosophical culture, or are unable 
to translate into an argument for their universality that is convincing for members of a 
different culture. 
It is thus a crucial desideratum for any Foundationalist theory that it responds to the 
Ethnocentricity Problem. Since Foundationalism holds that a person has a human right 
simply in virtue of humanity, it is susceptible to the danger that its operative notion of 
humanity is only acceptable within local cultures, rather than universally across cultures. 
The appeal of Functionalism is that it deftly sidesteps the Ethnocentricity Problem. 
In grounding human rights in the roles that they play within the practice of the positive 
human rights regime, Functionalism avoids committing to any pre-political normative 
considerations or views on the notions of humanity and human nature. It therefore 
avoids inviting the objection that these considerations or views may be ethnocentric. 
Rawls states that human rights
do not depend on any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical doctrine 
of human nature. The Law of Peoples does not say, for example, that human beings are moral 
persons and have equal worth in the eyes of God; or that they have certain moral and intel-
lectual powers that entitle them to these rights. To argue in these ways would involve religious 
or philosophical doctrines that many decent hierarchical peoples might reject as liberal or 
democratic, or as in some way distinctive of Western political tradition and prejudicial to 
other cultures.28 
27 Beitz (n 3) 67–68.
28 Rawls (n 5) 68.
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Similarly, Beitz writes that, for Functionalism, ‘[t]here is no assumption of a prior or 
independent layer of fundamental rights whose nature and content can be discovered 
independently of a consideration of the place of human rights in the international realm 
and its normative discourse’.29
The Ethnocentricity Problem poses a particularly acute problem for Metaphysical 
Foundationalism. On this view, recall, the pre-political normative considerations that 
ground human rights are universal human interests. This conclusion is arrived at 
through conceptual analysis of the notion of humanity, or of what makes human life go 
well. But this analysis, at least for thinkers such as Griffin and Tasioulas, occurs in the 
context of a liberal-democratic moral tradition. It therefore invites the worry that the 
concept of humanity under analysis has a particular cultural connotation specific to the 
liberal-democratic tradition.30 Thus, doubt arises as to whether the analysis yields a view 
of human interests that is truly universal. 
Indeed, some cultures may not value such interests as agency, autonomy, liberty or 
accomplishment as highly as the liberal-democratic culture. They also may not share 
the metaphysical presuppositions of Christianity, with its emphasis on freedom of the 
will, out of which the liberal-democratic culture grew. Saba Mahmood, for example, 
describes how individuals taking part in the women’s Islamic social movement in Egypt 
place value on a life of passivity and subservience, rather than on the activity constitutive 
of the liberal-democratic conceptions of autonomy and accomplishment.31
The Promise of Natural Law Foundationalism
How might the Metaphysical Foundationalist respond to the Ethnocentricity Problem? 
The nature of the problem mandates that she cannot appeal to the authority of the cul-
tural context in which her conception of universal human interests is rooted. She cannot, 
for example, argue that everyone can know that agency is a universal human interest 
because it is known to be so within the liberal-democratic tradition. This approach is 
unconvincing for members of cultures other than those to whose authority it appeals. 
It gives no argument that could be accepted by members of other cultures for why the 
moral beliefs within liberal-democratic cultures should determine what counts as a uni-
versal human interest. 
But notice that if it does give such an argument, it no longer amounts to an appeal 
to authority. Rather, it becomes a substantive first-order normative argument about the 
rational credentials of liberal-democratic moral beliefs concerning the universality of 
human interests. Hence, the Metaphysical Foundationalist must ultimately offer this sort 
29 Beitz (n 3) 102. 
30 Even Griffin recognises that the tradition of human rights thinking in which he writes has a history rooted 
in Catholic theology and Enlightenment ideals of personhood: Griffin (n 3) 9–14, 30–31.
31 Saba Mahmood, ‘Feminist Theory, Embodiment and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian 
Islamic Revival’ (2001) 16(2) Cultural Anthropology 202, 212–23.
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of substantive defence of the moral beliefs about universal human interests formulated 
within the liberal-democratic culture. This is the only tractable way to convince mem-
bers of other cultures that those beliefs ought to be accepted, and thereby address the 
Ethnocentricity Problem.
We find the representative Metaphysical Foundationalists in fact taking just this 
route. For Tasioulas, ‘whether or not a candidate norm is really a human right is to be 
determined by ordinary … moral reasoning’.32 Griffin argues that, in order to bring 
about ‘unforced agreement on human rights’, we must ‘put the case for human rights 
as best we can construct it from resources of the Western tradition, and hope that non-
Westerners will look into the case and be attracted by what they find’.33
It is helpful to clarify this important point using an example. Consider Jane, a 
representative Metaphysical Foundationalist in the liberal-democratic tradition, and 
Elizabeth, a member of a non-liberal culture. Jane holds moral beliefs about universal 
human interests. She aims to convince Elizabeth to accept them. How might she do this?
To appeal to the authority of the liberal-democratic culture is, as we have seen, illicit. 
So Jane must engage Elizabeth’s practical reason directly through ordinary moral rea-
soning. She must attempt to elicit Elizabeth’s assent by relying only on the rational force 
of the better moral argument34 that the universality of the human interests to which 
she is committed really is knowable as such by all people everywhere. She might try to 
have Elizabeth accept abstract first principles from the perspective of practical reason, 
and show her that a commitment to the human interests that she defends follows from 
them. Alternatively, she might construct thought experiments to show Elizabeth that her 
considered practical judgments about them disclose that the human interests in question 
are knowable as universal. But Jane cannot rationally allow Elizabeth to reject her moral 
beliefs simply on the grounds that they are formulated within the liberal-democratic 
context. Elizabeth would thereby make an illicit appeal to authority in the opposite dir-
ection. 
The lesson is that Jane’s goal must be to convince Elizabeth that acceptance of her 
moral beliefs is mandated from the perspective of practical deliberation itself. It must 
be to show that the universality of the human interests that she defends is discoverable 
by attending closely to the phenomenology of agency, and the way in which normativity 
is disclosed from a first-personal point of view. Jane must convince Elizabeth about the 
rational credentials of her moral beliefs by appealing, not to the authority of liberal-
democracy, but to the authority of the requirements of natural human practical reason. 
In other words, her beliefs’ credentials must derive from their special epistemological 
status as requirements of practical reason. 
32 Tasioulas, ‘Triggers’ (n 4) 938.
33 Griffin (n 3) 137. 
34 I borrow this phraseology from Jürgen Habermas. See his Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical 
Essays (Polity Press, 2008) 16.
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Jane can only achieve her goal by adopting the perspective of practical delibera-
tion herself. She must cooperatively aid the disclosure to Elizabeth of the requirements 
of practical reason from the first-personal perspective, using ‘ordinary moral reason-
ing’ to bring about Elizabeth’s ‘unforced agreement’. Of course, this does not entail that 
Jane may not eventually decide that her beliefs about universal human interests were 
incorrect all along. Indeed, Elizabeth may show that Jane has incorrectly grasped the 
requirements of practical reason, or that she has not attended correctly to the disclosure 
of normativity from a phenomenological point of view. But if this occurs, it must be the 
authority of practical deliberation that holds sway over Jane’s decision, and nothing else. 
This, then, must be the methodology by which Metaphysical Foundationalism 
addresses the Ethnocentricity Problem. Whether or not it succeeds is a question that I 
will not pursue.35 What is important for my purposes is that the methodology has a first-
personal, practical or epistemological posture. To address the Ethnocentricity Problem, 
Metaphysical Foundationalists must shift gears from the third-personal posture in which 
they identify, through conceptual analysis, the human interests that they purport to be 
universal, to a first-personal, practical and epistemological posture. Put otherwise, to 
ratify the results of their conceptual analysis, Metaphysical Foundationalists must over-
come skeptical doubt about their beliefs concerning the universality of basic human 
interests by appealing to the requirements of practical reason from the perspective of 
practical reason itself. That this must be the case is unsurprising, given that the Ethno-
centricity Problem is framed in epistemological terms; it asks Foundationalists how we 
can know of the cross-cultural applicability of purportedly universal human interests.
Now, the methodology by which Metaphysical Foundationalism must address the 
Ethnocentricity Problem is precisely the methodology by which Natural Law Foun-
dationalism begins its investigation of universal human goods. As I argued earlier, the 
posture of Natural Law Foundationalism is first-personal, practical and epistemological; 
it takes the universal human goods to be fundamental requirements of natural human 
practical reason, self-evidently discoverable through the natural operation of practical 
reason itself. Natural Law Foundationalism is therefore inherently well suited to address-
ing the Ethnocentricity Problem. Its posture allows it to address the Ethnocentricity 
Problem less circuitously than Metaphysical Foundationalism. It proposes that know-
ledge of the universality of certain human goods is tightly connected with knowledge of 
the requirements of practical reason. It does so at the start of its analysis, rather than first 
identifying human interests, and then having to justify the moral beliefs in the universal-
ity of those interests. Because Natural Law Foundationalism’s identification of universal 
human goods relies on those goods’ epistemological credentials from a first-personal, 
practical perspective, it is better suited to confronting the Ethnocentricity Problem 
(which raises skeptical doubt about those credentials) than is Metaphysical Founda-
35 For Griffin’s attempt, see On Human Rights (n 3) 137–42. 
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tionalism, which identifies universal human interests by relying on their metaphysical 
credentials, as they are ascertained from a third-personal, conceptual point of view. 
I therefore submit that Natural Law Foundationalism is a promising view that 
deserves closer attention and more extensive development. Its theoretical posture is such 
as to directly confront the main objection to Foundationalism that makes Functionalism 
an attractive view to many philosophers. By contrast, the theoretical posture of Meta-
physical Foundationalism only allows it to address the Ethnocentricity Problem in an 
indirect, roundabout fashion. In the remainder of this essay, I will take preliminary steps 
towards showing how Natural Law Foundationalism can deliver on its promise. 
IV. PRACTICAL REASON AND THE SELF-EVIDENCE  
OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN GOODS
Finnis’s Account
My argument so far has been largely meta-theoretical. I have spoken broadly of the 
posture and the promise of Natural Law Foundationalism. The argument must now be 
magnified. To show that Natural Law Foundationalism can make good on its promise, I 
will examine its main tenets more closely. These tenets, recall, are that human rights are 
grounded in universal human goods that attract the protection of positive legal insti-
tutions. The pursuit of these goods is a fundamental requirement of natural human 
practical reason. The goods are self-evidently knowable as universal because the require-
ments of practical reason are self-evidently knowable as such. In this Part, I intend to 
exhibit the philosophical plausibility of these assertions. 
Finnis defends a natural law account of how we come to self-evidently know human 
goods and the requirements of practical reason. His account has two components. First, 
he claims that human beings experience, from a practical perspective, ‘inclination[s]’ to 
engage in certain activities, or tendencies or dispositions towards doing certain kinds 
of actions.36 It is a natural feature of human practical reason to have such phenom-
enological experiences; having them is one way in which normativity is disclosed to us 
first-personally. Finnis’s example is the inclination to curiosity or the tendency towards 
inquiry. Upon reflection, however, we find that our tendency to inquire into the truth 
of a matter is not restricted by the particular questions which initially precipitated our 
curiosity: ‘One finds oneself reflecting that ignorance and muddle are to be avoided, sim-
ply as such and not merely in relation to a closed list of questions that one has raised.’37 
From this we notice that knowledge is a good to be pursued, not merely for its utility in 
answering the initial questions, but intrinsically and in general. Thus, upon reflection 
36 Finnis (n 6) 60. 
37 Ibid, 61. 
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we move from our initial inclinations to grasp of value—in Finnis’s example, the value 
of knowledge. 
Second, Finnis holds that it is indubitable that the objects which our experiences of 
practical inclinations incite us to grasp really are universal human goods. The goodness 
of those objects is, as Finnis says, ‘self-evident, obvious’.38 Knowledge of their goodness 
requires no philosophical demonstration. In particular, their goodness cannot be derived 
from the fact that we experience inclinations to do certain acts, since ‘no value can be 
deduced from a fact’.39 Thus, knowledge of human goods is self-evident because it is (a) 
underived knowledge and (b) not philosophically demonstrable knowledge. 
Finnis’s account clearly leaves us with some puzzling questions: What exactly does it 
mean to say that something is a requirement of practical reason? What does it mean to 
say that it is self-evidently knowable because knowledge of it is underived and undemon-
strable? How does the self-evidence of these requirements connect to inclination, grasp 
of value, and knowledge of human goods? In what follows I will consider and reject one 
initial approach to answering these questions, and then submit my own approach.
Intuitionism
On what I will call an intuitionist approach40 to interpreting Finnis’s account, human 
beings have a special faculty that imparts direct cognitive access to value, analogous 
to how vision gives us cognitive access to physical objects. The proposed faculty first 
operates through rudimentary features of our practical reason, namely, inclinations or 
tendencies towards certain acts, such as curiosity. By manifesting in these requirements 
of practical reason, it directs our attention towards values, such as knowledge. We then 
come to self-evidently know of human goods because the proposed faculty allows us to 
cognitively ‘latch on’ to them, and thereby grasp them. 
This approach might seem attractive at first blush. It offers a simple explanation 
of how we self-evidently know the human goods from a practical, first-personal per-
spective, and of how normativity is disclosed to us phenomenologically. It also explains 
how this knowledge is underived and undemonstrable by interpreting Finnis as holding 
that we move from inclination to grasp of value through an immediate, ‘flash of insight’ 
process. But the approach fails once we see that the special faculty that it posits can be 
construed in two equally problematic ways. 
On the one hand, the faculty might be construed as describable in purely material 
terms, as physical organs of the human body might be. That is, its operation may be 
purely describable in terms of organic tissue, the firing of nerve-endings, etc. If so, its 
38 Ibid, 65.
39 Ibid, 66. 
40 It could be possible to interpret Haight and Joseph’s work along the lines of the intuitionist approach that 
I canvass here. See Jonathan Haight and Craig Joseph, ‘Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions 
Generate Culturally Variable Virtues’ (2004) 133 Daedalus 5.
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malfunction—its failure to ‘latch on’ to value—should be describable simply in terms of 
some mechanical defect in its material operations. 
This is not, however, how Finnis describes a mature person’s inability to grasp 
human goods. He says that to deny a human good is ‘as straightforwardly unreasonable 
as anything can be’.41 For Finnis, failure to grasp a human good is attributable to some 
normative failure of reasonableness, not to some mechanical failing in our biological 
hardware. Finnis is also clear that the question of how we move from inclination to grasp 
of value is not answerable by pointing to our organic constitution or to the biological 
preconditions of that grasp.42 Thus, this first construal of the intuitionistic approach 
does not offer an accurate interpretation of Finnis’s account.
To avoid this difficulty, the faculty for cognitively accessing value posited by the intui-
tionistic approach might be construed non-materially. It may be regarded as something 
embedded in the human mind that allows us to latch on to value, yet not something, say, 
embedded in the human brain. It may be like a faculty, or the same faculty, that allows 
us to grasp non-tangible, abstract objects, such as numbers, propositions or aesthetic 
qualities. Of course, we should be wary when positing such a faculty. Its non-material 
nature renders it unable to be verified by scientific investigation, leaving us with unstable 
grounds for ontologically committing to it. However, it could be that the faculty has 
a psychological existence, similar to such familiar notions as personality-types or an 
innate mental structure that allows us to acquire language. If its existence is similar to 
these accepted aspects of the human mind, it may not be totally impervious to empirical 
verification. 
But this line of thought leads to further interpretive difficulties. Finnis states that 
the capacity to know of the human goods ‘is not somehow innate, inscribed on the 
mind at birth’.43 It must therefore differ from such mental faculties as the capacity to 
acquire language. Finnis also holds that it is not relevant to ask a psychologist’s opinion 
about whether something is a human good to discover whether it is so. On his account, 
knowledge of human goods has no ‘sub-rational cause’.44 It is therefore dissimilar to 
something like a personality-type. 
Hence, neither the materialistic nor the non-materialistic construal of the faculty 
posited by the intuitionistic approach to interpreting Finnis’s account actually har-
monises with his account. We should therefore reject it as an implausible interpretive 
approach, and search for an approach that is harmonious with Finnis’s account. 
41 Finnis (n 6) 69 (emphasis added).
42 Ibid, 65. 
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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The Human Goods as Intelligibility-Conditions
When discussing the human good of knowledge, Finnis states that, in explaining what one 
is up to when one is inclined towards investigating a subject-matter which has aroused 
one’s curiosity, ‘one finds oneself able and ready to refer to finding out, knowledge, truth 
as sufficient explanations of the point of one’s activity, project or commitment’.45 He also 
asks, ‘Is it not the case that knowledge really is a good … and that the principle which 
expresses its value formulates a real (intelligent) reason for action?’46 These remarks 
suggest that, on natural law theory, the human goods represent reasons for action from 
the first-personal, phenomenological perspective of practical reason. They explain why 
we do what we do. If I do not recognise that the good of knowledge provides a reason for 
me to inquire into the truth of a matter in some situation, I would find my act of inquiry 
inexplicable and pointless, lacking a basis in rationality or intelligibility. As Finnis says, 
‘In trying to make sense of someone’s commitments, projects, and actions over a period, 
we may say that he acted “on the basis that” knowledge is a good worthy of a life-shaping 
devotion’.47 
Building on these remarks, I propose the following as an approach to understand-
ing Finnis’s account of how we come to self-evidently know the human goods and the 
requirements of practical reason.48 The human goods provide basic reasons for action 
from a first-personal, practical point of view. Their pursuit is a requirement of natural 
human practical reason because they must be postulated, from the practical perspective, 
as reasons for us to engage in the activities we have tendencies, inclinations or dispos-
itions to engage in. Postulating them as reasons for action confers intelligibility on our 
inclinations. The human goods are conditions of the intelligibility of our inclinations. 
They enable our tendencies to do certain acts to make sense to us phenomenologically. 
For example, my inclination to seek medical assistance when I am grievously injured is 
rendered intelligible because I take the goodness of my life as a reason for seeking med-
ical assistance. On the approach I defend, to move from inclination to grasp of value is 
to reflect on and recognise the need to postulate the human goods as reasons for action 
that confer intelligibility on our inclinations. 
The requirements of practical reason, and hence the human goods, are knowable 
self-evidently because to deny them entangles us in a form of practical contradiction.49 
Denying that the human goods are reasons for action deprives us of a basis for claim-
ing that the actions towards which we are inclined are intelligible. It deprives us of the 
45 Ibid, 61 (emphasis in original). 
46 Ibid, 64.
47 Ibid. 
48 I have benefited greatly from Mark Murphy’s writings on natural law theory in thinking through this pro-
posal. See especially Murphy (n 25) 1–3, 6–13. 
49 Finnis similarly argues that skepticism about the goods of knowledge is impossible because to deny that 
knowledge involves one in a performative contradiction. See Finnis (n 6) 73–75. 
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grounds for understanding how and whether our tendencies can make sense to us from 
a first-personal point of view. As Finnis argues, the requirements of practical reason 
are self-evident in much the same way as the requirements of theoretical rationality, 
such as the requirement that self-contradictory theses should be abandoned, and that 
simple, predictively successful and explanatorily powerful theses should be preferred. 
Denying the requirements of theoretical rationality disables us from making sense of our 
tendency to assent to empirical theses conforming to them. It deprives us of a basis for 
claiming that such assent is intelligible.50
Furthermore, on the approach I defend, a person’s failure to grasp the human goods 
is a normative failing or a failure of reasonableness. It consists in a failure to reflect on 
and recognise that the human goods must be postulated as reasons for action that confer 
intelligibility on our inclinations. It disables us from understanding how our tendencies 
to do certain acts can make practical sense to us. This approach therefore succeeds where 
the intuitionist approach falls short. The intuitionist approach (at least on a materialist 
construal of the special faculty that it posits for cognitively accessing value), recall, can 
regard a failure to grasp the human goods only as a non-normative, mechanical failure. 
My approach can also explain how self-evident knowledge of the human goods and 
of the requirements of practical reason is underived knowledge. It is underived because 
it is arrived at by postulating that the human goods are intelligibility-conferring rea-
sons for the actions towards which we are inclined. It is not arrived at by deriving the 
human goods from the fact that we have a disposition towards certain acts. This can be 
seen once it is recognised that a postulate is distinct from a derivation. A postulate is 
a self-evident premise from which a conclusion may be drawn. By contrast, a derived 
proposition is a conclusion drawn from a set of premises. To derive a proposition ‘Y’ 
from another proposition ‘X’ requires asserting the proposition ‘If X then Y’. To postulate 
‘Y’ as an explanation for ‘X’ requires asserting ‘If Y then X’. I do not claim here that if we 
are inclined towards a certain act then to do the act is to pursue a human good. Rather, I 
claim that if our inclination to do a certain act is explicable as intelligible, then pursuit of 
a human good is a reason to do that act that confers intelligibility on it.51 
Since we arrive at knowledge of the human goods and the requirements of practical 
reason by postulating that the human goods are intelligibility-conferring reasons for 
actions towards which we are inclined, it is also undemonstrated knowledge. To pos-
tulate a proposition is not to provide a philosophical argument for it. Rather, it is to 
assert it as a premise or starting point from which to provide philosophical arguments 
for other propositions. That does not mean that we lack rational grounds for making 
postulates. Although they are not argued for, they are presupposed in order to explain 
or render intelligible certain phenomena, such as the inclinations we experience or our 
tendency to assent to certain empirical theses. Such presuppositions can be more or less 
rational according to their explanatory or intelligibility-conferring capabilities. 
50 Ibid, 68–69.
51 For discussion, see ibid, 63–64. 
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In summary, on my approach, the human goods and the requirements of practical 
reason are self-evident because they have the status of pre-philosophical postulates. 
The need to postulate them is graspable by reflecting on the reasons that make our 
practical tendencies intelligible to us from a first-personal perspective. A catalogue of 
human goods to pre-philosophically postulate can be adjudged as more or less rational 
according to the effectiveness with which it confers intelligibility on our tendencies. The 
rationality of the catalogue also depends on the propriety of the resources that it offers 
to furnish normative philosophical arguments that the human goods it includes ought to 
attract the protection of the positive legal-political human rights regime. 
V. THE ETHNOCENTRICITY PROBLEM REVISITED
Perry’s Objection
To review, Natural Law Foundationalism is a promising view because its theoretical 
posture is such as to allow it to confront the Ethnocentricity Problem more straight-
forwardly than Metaphysical Foundationalism. Unlike Metaphysical Foundationalism, 
it exhibits a practical, first-personal theoretical posture from the start of its analysis. It 
holds that the human goods which attract the protection of positive institutions owe 
their importance to their epistemological status as self-evident requirements of natural 
human practical reason. It therefore promises to be able to directly assuage the skeptical 
doubts about the universality of those goods raised by the Ethnocentricity Problem. In 
addition, Natural Law Foundationalism can deliver on its promise. There is a plausible 
argument available for its central contention that the human goods are requirements of 
practical reason. On this argument, the human goods are conditions of the intelligibility 
of our practical inclinations. We can self-evidently know, from a practical, first-personal 
perspective, that there are important human goods linked to the notion of humanity 
itself. Such knowledge arises from attending to the disclosure of normativity from a 
phenomenological view of what it is like to be a human being with natural human prac-
tical reason. This phenomenological view discloses that the human goods are reasons for 
action that render our practical dispositions intelligible. 
Natural Law Foundationalism must now confront the Ethnocentricity Problem. 
How can we know that the human goods are universally applicable across cultures, 
rather than just for those of us within the liberal-democratic context? The possibility 
of self-evident knowledge of the universality of human goods, on Finnis’s account, has 
recently been challenged by Michael Perry.52 Perry’s objection is that even if I (or mem-
bers of my culture) self-evidently know, from my (our) first-personal perspective, that a 
human good must be posited as an intelligibility-conferring reason for my inclinations, 
52 Michael J Perry, Towards a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts (Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
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it does not follow that the same good must be postulated as an intelligibility-conferring 
reason for the inclinations of members of cultures other than mine (ours), from their 
own first-personal perspective. If that is true, then I cannot self-evidently know of the 
universality of that good. I cannot claim to know that members of other cultures act 
contrary to the requirements of practical reason by denying or failing to grasp a human 
good just because it would be contrary to those requirements for me to do so. Although 
my denial renders the actions towards which I am inclined to be unintelligible, it does 
not follow that the same is true for others.53 
Indeed, human rights may be grounded in human goods that impart intelligibility-
conferring reasons for our inclinations from the perspective of natural human practical 
reason. And these goods may derive their importance from their status as self-evidently 
knowable requirements of practical reason. But if members of the liberal-democratic 
culture cannot know that members of other cultures experience the same inclinations as 
they do, they cannot self-evidently know of the cross-cultural applicability of the human 
goods that confer intelligibility on our inclinations. The postulation of those goods 
would not be required to render intelligible the practical dispositions that all persons 
have simply in virtue of possessing natural human practical reason if there are no such 
dispositions.
How Natural Law Foundationalism Responds to the Ethnocentricity Problem
Natural Law Foundationalism’s response to these problem posed by Perry builds on 
Finnis’s writings. Finnis claims that the way in which natural law theory identifies 
the human goods (and, hence, the requirements of practical reason) is not limited to 
the horizon our own first-personal perspective, although this is its starting point and 
ultimate normative resource. Rather, we can partly base our postulations of the intel-
ligibility-conferring reasons for our inclinations on third-personal observations of 
the commitments, activities and experiences of members of other cultures from their 
first-personal perspective. Finnis states that the ‘plasticity of human inclinations, which 
correlates with the generality or universality of the corresponding values understood by 
one’s practical intelligence, is important for an accurate grasp … of the human virtues 
and vices’.54 Our third-personally acquired information of other cultural conventions, 
however, does not furnish a derivation of values from facts. Instead, it corroborates our 
own postulations of human goods from our own practical perspective.55
For natural law theory, we can ultimately be sure about the universality of human 
goods by exposing ourselves to the experiences of other cultures. By observing the vari-
ety of different cultural activities, we can discover third-personally that members of 
53 See ibid, 18–19. 
54 Finnis (n 6) 84. 
55 Ibid, 66. 
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other cultures experience first-personally the same inclinations to engage in certain acts 
that those of us in the liberal-democratic context experience. This is true even though 
the inclinations manifest themselves diversely. 
Since we can self-evidently know of human goods because they impart intelligibil-
ity-conferring reasons for our inclinations, and since we can observe that all persons 
experience inclinations that are similar to ours, we can self-evidently know the human 
goods as postulates that confer intelligibility on all persons’ inclinations. As Finnis writes, 
our observations ‘open to us a revelation or reminder of the range of opportunities open 
to us in shaping our own life through the free and selective pursuit of the basic values’.56 
Hence, Natural Law Foundationalism’s response to the Ethnocentricity Problem is this: 
Knowledge of the universality of the human goods that impart reasons for action is 
self-evident because pursuit of the human goods renders intelligible the actions towards 
which all persons in all cultures are inclined to engage in. 
It might be said, however, that this response presupposes that all persons in all cul-
tures do phenomenologically experience the same practical dispositions. But is it true 
that normativity is disclosed first-personally in the same way for all persons, simply 
because of what it is like to be a human being with natural human practical reason? 
Finnis, for one, answers this question in the affirmative. He holds that, in one way or 
another, all people cross-culturally experience dispositions towards preserving human 
life, educating other members of their society, reciprocally cooperating with others, 
engaging in recreational activities, and honouring supernatural power.57 In order to 
render these dispositions intelligible, we must postulate that all persons regard certain 
human goods, such as life, knowledge, friendship, play and religion, as imparting reasons 
for action. Moreover, in order for persons in other cultures to make sense of their own 
inclinations from their own practical point of view, they must make the same postulate. 
Finnis is not alone in making this argument. Martha Nussbaum contends we can 
third-personally observe that all people cross-culturally have what she calls ‘grounding 
experiences’ from a first-personal point of view.58 Grounding experiences are experiences 
of spheres of human life that are universally salient to all persons. They are disclosed 
phenomenologically to natural human practical reason. While they are common to all 
cultures, different cultures may respond to them differently. Nussbaum states that ‘eve-
ryone makes some choices and acts somehow or other in these spheres’.59 On her view, 
everyone has attitudes, responses and behavioural dispositions towards some universally 
salient features of human practical life, but their interpretation of these features differs 
from culture to culture. For example, all persons experience some disposition to react to 
56 Ibid, 84. 
57 Ibid, 83–84. 
58 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach’ in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya 
Sen (eds), The Quality of Life (Oxford University Press, 1993) 245, 247. 
59 Ibid, 247.
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mortality, pleasure and pain, and affiliation, but individuals’ dispositional reactions can 
be manifested in variegated ways.60
Arguments such as these help to reinforce the initially controversial presupposition 
made by Natural Law Foundationalism’s response to the Ethnocentricity Problem. We 
can self-evidently know that the human goods and the requirements of practical reason 
are universally applicable across cultures because they must be postulated as intelligi-
bility-conferring reasons for action for the inclinations that all people experience from 
a first-personal perspective, simply in virtue of possessing human practical reason. Our 
own grasp of the need to make this postulation to render our own inclinations intelligi-
ble for us (or for people within our own culture) is self-evident. But it is substantiated by 
third-personal observation of the need for members of other cultures to postulate them 
to render their inclinations intelligible for them. 
I will use another example to illustrate this response to the Ethnocentricity Problem. 
Recall Jane the Foundationalist and Elizabeth, a member of a non-liberal culture. Sup-
pose that Jane is a Natural Law Foundationalist. She holds that the nature of human rights 
is grounded in human goods, identifiable within a pre-political substratum of moral 
thought, that attract the protection of the legal-political human rights regime. Knowl-
edge of these goods is self-evident because they are postulated as reasons for action that 
confer intelligibility on our practical dispositions. They are therefore requirements of 
natural human practical reason, discoverable from the first-personal, phenomenological 
perspective of practical reason itself. Jane aims to convince Elizabeth of the universality 
of her beliefs about these human goods. How might she do so? 
Jane cannot appeal to the authority of the liberal-democratic culture in which her 
moral beliefs were formulated. If human goods owed their importance to their status as 
components of liberal-democratic morality, they would not be universally applicable 
to all cultures. Jane must therefore engage Elizabeth’s practical reason directly through 
substantive moral argument. 
Jane is well suited to engaging Elizabeth in this way. Her moral beliefs about human 
goods, namely that they are self-evidently graspable by postulating the human goods as 
intelligibility-conferring reasons for doing the acts to which we are inclined, are formu-
lated within the perspective of natural human practical reason itself. In this sense, the 
goods owe their importance to their epistemological status as requirements of practical 
reason. Thus, to engage Elizabeth’s practical reason Jane need not exit the theoretical 
posture within which she first identified the human goods and shift to a practical theo-
retical posture. On her view, the need to postulate the human goods as reasons for action 
is mandated by the first-personal, phenomenological disclosure of normativity to natu-
ral human practical reason. She can therefore engage Elizabeth’s practical reason and her 
first-personal, phenomenological perspective directly and non-circuitously.
60 Ibid, 263–5.
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Now, Elizabeth might accept that, from Jane’s first-personal perspective, the human 
goods are important because they are self-evidently knowable requirements of practi-
cal reason for Jane. She might accept the necessity of postulating the human goods as 
intelligibility-conferring reasons for action for Jane’s inclinations. But how, Elizabeth 
may ask, can we know self-evidently that the human goods are universal? How can Jane 
know that everyone must postulate them as intelligibility-conferring reasons for action 
for their inclinations? How can Jane convince me that they are self-evidently knowable 
requirements of practical reason for me?
On Jane’s view, the response to these queries is that her beliefs about the universal 
applicability of the human goods can be corroborated by observing third-personally the 
inclinations of members of many different cultures. This observation would reveal that 
the first-personal practical experiences of all people everywhere are similar to hers. All 
people everywhere have inclinations to engage in similar activities. This is so even if the 
ways in which these activities are engaged in are diverse or these practical inclinations are 
manifested in variable ways. It is typical of natural human practical reason to have these 
inclinations. Thus, the human goods must be postulated as intelligibility-conferring rea-
sons for the activities towards which all people everywhere are inclined. That they must 
be so postulated is what makes them self-evidently knowable from the perspective of 
practical reason itself, for all people everywhere. 
Jane can therefore extend her beliefs about the human goods beyond the horizon 
of her own practical perspective, and thereby have knowledge of their universality. She 
can justify the credentials of her beliefs to Elizabeth by pointing out that Elizabeth’s own 
first-personal inclinations are similar to hers, even if they are manifested differently, or 
if Elizabeth engages in the activities towards which they are each inclined differently. She 
can convince Elizabeth that pursuit of human goods is also a requirement of Elizabeth’s 
practical reason by showing her that normativity is phenomenologically disclosed to 
each of them in the same way. She can show Elizabeth that the human goods impart 
reasons for action to both of them, and allow them each to understand how their incli-
nations make practical sense to them from a first-personal perspective. In doing so, Jane 
appeals to no authority but that of natural human practical reason.
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this essay, my goal has been to construct a case for Natural Law Foundationalism 
as a theory of the nature of universal human rights. Generally stated, the case for this 
theory is that its first-personal, practical theoretical posture allows it to directly confront 
the main objection to all Foundationalist views that gives Functionalism its appeal, the 
Ethnocentricity Problem. It is therefore a promising view that merits more extensive 
development. Furthermore, Natural Law Foundationalism can deliver on its promise 
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because its central tenets have sufficient philosophical plausibility. I have defended an 
interpretation of its contention, originally put forward by John Finnis, that the human 
goods it posits which attract the protection of the legal-political human rights are self-
evidently discoverable from the perspective of natural human practical reason. I have 
argued that this interpretation can be developed to offer a plausible response to the Eth-
nocentricity Problem. 
I will close by emphasising the modesty of the conclusions that I believe have been 
reached in this essay. I do not claim that the essay’s case for Natural Law Foundational-
ism is such as to render Metaphysical Foundationalism defunct, or the Ethnocentricity 
Problem definitively answered. I do not claim that it deflects every forthcoming Func-
tionalist criticism of Functionalism. What I believe I have established in this essay is 
more modest. Its arguments lay the groundwork for further investigation into these mat-
ters by delineating the meaning, shape and direction of Natural Law Foundationalism 
and displaying its potential and attractiveness. I hope to have shown why Natural Law 
Foundationalism is a legitimate participant in the contemporary clash between Founda-
tionalism and Functionalism, and why it should be taken more seriously as such.
